Security and Usability: Designing Secure Systems That People Can Use
11.5. Privacy and Security Issues
If keystroke dynamics gain widespread acceptance, privacy and security issues must be evaluated carefully. Of concern are databases that maintain the keystroke timing patterns of users. With this information, attackers can subvert authentication systems that rely on keystroke biometrics. If an attacker is able to obtain a particular user's keystroke timing profile, he may be able to guess which keys the user is typing simply by analyzing the timing of keystrokes. Such an attack may succeed against encrypted keystrokes as they are sent over a network, without ever needing to decrypt the data. For example, if it is known that the user spends 800 milliseconds typing the digraph io but usually spends around 1,400 milliseconds typing yr, an attacker can narrow the search space of plausible keystrokes, with the hope of finding an interpretation of the timings that results in a plausible original text. In 2001, researchers proved that this attack could work when they deciphered encrypted passwords sent through version 2 of the SSH protocol (used for remote access to computer terminals). Their technique allowed them to find the password an average of 50 times faster than brute force methods by utilizing a weakness in the protocol that allowed an attacker to determine precise timings for each keystroke and a database of user keystroke profiles.[31] Even when user-specific keystroke profiles are not available, generic keystroke profiles created from any representative population subset have been found to weaken security. In addition, the attacker may be able to employ this tactic with very low-tech meansfor example, by using a tape recorder to listen to the click-clack of a user typing at a keyboard. [31] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian, "Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH," Tenth USENIX Security Symposium (2001); http://www.usenix.org/events/sec01/song.html. Systems that monitor typing patterns (see the earlier section, "Identification and Monitoring") must also guard against privacy breaches. If the monitoring process produces records, these records must be protected by both a policy regarding their use and a mechanism to prevent unauthorized access to the records. But such safeguards do not protect against covert monitoring and tracking of individuals, wherein a third party might secretly collect a keystroke profile from an unsuspecting user to monitor the user's activities in the future, or to subvert keystroke authentication systems by posing as the legitimate user with the collected biometrics. A governmental agency, for instance, could collect keystroke traces of targeted individuals from computer terminals in public libraries or at other official public kiosks. This data could be used to monitor and track an individual as he moves from one public system to the next. A private entity could do likewise from a private but publicly accessible system, such as an online registration application. Once an entity has a copy of a user's keystroke biometric, its ability to perform identity theft against other keystroke biometrics-enabled systems is greatly enhanced.
[a] J. D. Garcia, "Personal identification apparatus," U.S. Patent 4,621,334 (1986). [b] J. R. Young and R. W. Hammon, "Method and apparatus for verifying an individual's identity," U.S. Patent 4,805,222 (1989). [c] BioNet Systems, LLC, "BiopasswordQuestions and Answers," Technical Report, 2002; http://www.biopassword.com/home/FAQs/BP_General_FAQs_112502.pdf. [d] M. E. Brown and S. J. Rogers, "Method and apparatus for verification of a computer user's identification, based on keystroke characteristics." U.S. Patent, Washington, D.C., 1996. Patent Number 5,557,686. [e] A. G. Zilberman, "Security method and apparatus employing authentication by keystroke dynamics." U.S. Patent, Washington, D.C., 2002. Patent Number 6,442,692. |