The Best Damn Firewall Book Period

Everyone is familiar with the oft-used saying, "What you don't know can't hurt you." However, anyone who has ever bought a used automobile has learned, first hand, the absurdity of this statement. In the world of network security, the ability to know when an intruder is engaged in reconnaissance, or other malicious activity, can mean the difference between being compromised and not being compromised. In addition, in some environments, what you don't know can directly affect employment—yours.

IDSs can detect ICMP and other types of network reconnaissance scans that might indicate an impending attack. In addition, the IDS can alert the admin of a successful compromise, which allows him the opportunity to implement mitigating actions before further damage is caused.

IDSs provide the security administrator with a window into the inner workings of the network, analogous to an x-ray or a blood test in the medical field. The ability to analyze the internal network traffic and to determine the existence of network viruses and worms is not altogether different from techniques used by the medical profession. The similarity of network viruses and worms to their biological counterparts has resulted in their medical monikers. IDSs provide the microscope necessary to detect these invaders. Without the aid of intrusion detection, a security administrator is vulnerable to exploits and will become aware of the presence of exploits only after a system crashes or a database is corrupted.

Why Are Attackers Interested in Me?

"The Attack of the Zombies"—sounds a lot like an old B-grade movie, doesn't it? Unfortunately, in this case, it is not cinema magic. Zombie attacks are real and cost corporations and consumers billions. Zombies are computerized soldiers under the control of nefarious hackers, and in the process of performing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, they blindly carry out the will of their masters.

In February 2000, a major DDoS attack blocked access to eBay, Amazon.com, AOL-TimeWarner, CNN, Dell Computers, Excite, Yahoo!, and other e-commerce giants. The damage done by this DDoS ranged from slowdown to complete system outages. The U.S. Attorney General instructed the FBI to launch a criminal investigation. This historical attack was perpetrated by a large group of compromised computers operating in concert.

The lesson to be learned from this event is that no network is too small to be left unprotected. If a hacker can use your computer, he will. The main purpose of the CodeRed exploit was to perform a DDoS on the White House Web site. It failed, due only to the author's oversight in using a hard-coded IP address instead of Domain Name Services. The exploit compromised over a million computers, ranging from corporate networks to home users.

In light of the recent virus activity, the growth of the information security industry, and taking into account government-sponsored hacking, the use of an IDS such can prove crucial in the protection of the world's network infrastructure.

Where Does an IDS Fit with the Rest of My Security Plan?

IDSs are a great addition to a network's defense-in-depth architecture. They can be used to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses in your perimeter protection devices; for example, firewalls and routers. The firewall rules and router access lists can be verified regularly for functionality. In the event these devices are reconfigured, the IDS can provide auditing for change management control.

IDS logs can be used to enforce security policy and are a great source of forensic evidence. Inline IDSs can halt active attacks on your network while alerting administrators to their presence.

Properly placed IDSs can alert you to the presence of internal attacks. Industry analysis of percentages varies. However, the consensus is that the majority of attacks occur from within.

An IDS can detect failed administrator login attempts and recognize password-guessing programs. Configured with the proper ruleset, it can monitor critical application access and immediately notify the system administrator of possible breaches in security.

Doesn't My Firewall Serve as an IDS?

At this point, you may hazard the question, "doesn't my firewall serve as an IDS?" Absolutely Not! Having said that, we shall try to stop the deluge of scorn from firewall administrators who might take exception to the statement. Admittedly, a firewall can be configured to detect certain types of intrusions, such as an attempt to access the Trojan backdoor SubSeven's port 27374. In addition, it could be configured to generate an alert for any attempt to penetrate your network. In the strictest sense this would be an IDS function.

However, it is asking enough of the technology to simply determine what should and shouldn't be allowed into or out of your network without expecting it to analyze the internal contents of every packet. Even a proxy firewall is not designed to examine the contents of all packets; the function would be enormously CPU intensive. Nevertheless, a firewall should be an integral part of your defense-in-depth, with its main function being a gatekeeper and a filter (see Table 4.1).

Firewalls and IDS do both enforce network policy, but how they implement it is completely different. An IDS is a reconnaissance system: It collects information and will notify you of what it's found. An IDS can find any type of packet it's designed to find by a defined signature.

A firewall, on the other hand, is a like a dragon protecting the castle. It keeps out the untrusted network traffic, and only allows in what it has defined as being acceptable. For example, if an attacker has managed to compromise a Web server and uses it to store contraband (for example, pornographic materials, pirated software), your firewall will not detect this. However, if your Web server is being used for inappropriate content, this can be discovered through your IDS.

Both firewall logs and IDS logs can provide you with information to help with computer forensics or any incident handling efforts. If a system is compromised, you will have some logs on what has been going on—through both the firewall and the IDS.

What makes an IDS necessary for a defense in depth is that it can be used to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses in your perimeter protection devices; in other words, firewalls and routers. Firewall rules and router access lists can be verified regularly for functionality. You can set up various IDS signatures to test your firewall to make sure it's not letting some undesired network traffic through the filter. This is covered in greater detail in Part VI of this book.

Where Else Should I Be Looking for Intrusions?

When computers that have been otherwise stable and functioning properly begin to perform erratically and periodically hang or show the Blue Screen of Death, a watchful security administrator should consider the possibility of a buffer overflow attack.

Buffer overflow attacks represent a large percentage of today's computer exploits. Failure of programmers to check input code has led to some of the most destructive and costly vulnerabilities to date.

Exploits that are designed to overflow buffers are usually operating system (OS) and application software specific. Without going into detail, the input to the application software is manipulated in such a manner as to cause a system error or "smash the stack" as it is referred to by some security professionals. At this point in the exploit, malicious code is inserted into the computer's process stack and the hacker gains control of the system.

In some cases, for the exploit to be successful, the payload, or malicious code, must access OS functions located at specific memory addresses. If the application is running on an OS other than that for which the exploit was designed, the results of overflowing the buffer will be simply a system crash and not a compromise; the system will appear to be unstable with frequent resets. Interestingly, in this situation the definition of the exploit changes from a system compromise to a DoS attack.

IDSs can alert you to buffer overflow attacks. Snort has a large arsenal of rules designed to detect these attacks; the following are just a few:

• Red Hat lprd overflow

• Linux samba overflow

• IMAP login overflow

• Linux mountd overflow

Backdoors and Trojans

Backdoors and Trojans come in many flavors. However, they all have one thing in common—they are remote control programs. Some are malicious code designed to "zombiefy" your computer, drafting it into a hacker's army for further exploits. Others are designed to eavesdrop on your keystrokes and send your most private data to their authors. Programs such as Netbus, SubSeven, and BO2k are designed to perform these tasks with minimal training on the part of the hacker.

Remote control programs can have legitimate purposes, such as remote system administration. PCAnywhere, Citrix, and VNC are examples of commercial and free remote control programs. However, it should be pointed out that commercial products, in the hands of hackers, could just as easily be used for compromise. The legitimate use of these tools should be monitored, especially in sensitive environments.

Snort has many rules to aid the security administrator in detecting unauthorized use of these programs.

Case Study: The Unpatriotic Computer

Being alerted when an attempt to compromise your network is taking place provides valuable information. Such information allows you to take proactive steps to mitigate vulnerabilities, and then to take steps to secure your perimeter from further attempts. Equally valuable information, and perhaps even more important, is confirmation that you have been compromised. In other words, while the knowledge of an attempt might be useful, the knowledge of a successful compromise is crucial.

In the early hours of the CodeRed attack, the information available to construct an attack signature was sketchy. The global Internet community was reeling from the sheer volume of attacks and trying to cope with the network destruction. During those initial hours, we became aware of the intent of CodeRed. One of its main purposes was to perform a DoS attack on the White House Web site. Thousands of computer zombies operating in concert would have flooded www.whitehouse.gov with 410MB of data every four and a half hours per instance of the worm. The amount of data would quickly have overwhelmed the government computer and rendered it useless.

Armed with this knowledge, at our site we immediately built an attack signature using the White House's IP address of 198.137.240.91 and configured Snort to monitor the egress to the Internet. Any attempt to access this address would generate an alert, plus the log provided us with the source address of the attacking computer. Essentially, what we accomplished was a method of remotely detecting the presence of compromised systems on our internal network.

The author of CodeRed hard-coded the Internet address into the payload, thereby allowing the White House networking administrators to simply change the Internet address and thwart the attack. We continued to use our signature that was built on the old IP address and it proved to be invaluable on many occasions, alerting us to newly compromised systems.