| | | Copyright |
| | | Praise for Infectious Greed |
| | | FINANCIAL TIMES Prentice Hall |
| | | Financial Times Prentice Hall Books |
| | | Preface |
| | | Acknowledgments |
| | | Chapter 1. The Importance of Investor Confidence |
| | | | Asleep at the Wheel |
| | | | Investor Attitude |
| | | | Investor Confidence and the Stock Market |
| | | | Long-Term Economic Effects |
| | | | Our Approach |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | Chapter 2. The Structure of Corporations |
| | | | Business Forms |
| | | | People in Business |
| | | | Separation of Ownership and Control |
| | | | Can Investors Influence Managers? |
| | | | Are Investors Helpless? |
| | | | A System of Problems |
| | | | International Monitoring |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | Part 1. The Failure of Executives |
| | | | Chapter 3. Executive Compensation and Incentives |
| | | | Types of Executive Compensation |
| | | | CEO Pay Around the World |
| | | | Hidden Compensation |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 4. Executive Behavior |
| | | | Options and Fraud |
| | | | Timing of Sales |
| | | | Company Loans ”A Potential Abuse |
| | | | Grand Theft |
| | | | Why Do Some Executives Misbehave? |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| |
| | | Part 2. The Failure of Monitoring Systems |
| | | | Chapter 5. Accountants and Auditors |
| | | | Accounting Functions |
| | | | Auditing |
| | | | The Changing Role of Accounting |
| | | | From Management to Fraud |
| | | | Fraud, Plain and Simple |
| | | | Consultants |
| | | | When the Auditor is also a Consultant |
| | | | Fear of All Sums |
| | | | An International Perspective |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 6. The Board of Directors |
| | | | Current Board Regulations |
| | | | More Attention on Directors |
| | | | Who Are Directors? |
| | | | The Board's Functions |
| | | | Problems with Boards |
| | | | Is Enron's Board Partially to Blame? |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 7. Investment Banks |
| | | | Some Historical Perspective |
| | | | Investment Banking Activities |
| | | | IPO Problems |
| | | | IPOs and Fraud |
| | | | Structured Deals |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 8. Analysts |
| | | | The Traditional Role of the Analyst |
| | | | Can Analysts Predict? |
| | | | Analyst Compensation |
| | | | Potential Conflicts of Interest |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 9. More Failed Monitors: Credit Rating Agencies and Lawyers |
| | | | Credit Rating Agencies |
| | | | Attorneys |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| |
| | | Part 3: Shortcomings in Enforcement and Investor Activism |
| | | | Chapter 10. The Securities and Exchange Commission |
| | | | The Securities Acts |
| | | | Organizational Structure of the SEC |
| | | | Assessment of the Acts and the SEC |
| | | | SEC Problem Areas |
| | | | Arthur Levitt's I Told You So |
| | | | The Man in the Middle: Harvey Pitt |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 11. Investor Activism |
| | | | What Is Shareholder Activism? |
| | | | Does Institutional Shareholder Activism Pay Off? |
| | | | Potential Roadblocks to Effective Shareholder Activism |
| | | | The Future Role of Shareholder Activists |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| |
| | | Part 4. Restoring Confidence |
| | | | Chapter 12. New Rules, Regulations, and Policies |
| | | | A Review of the Corporate Problems |
| | | | Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 |
| | | | Other Proposals for Change |
| | | | More Change |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 13. Create Good Incentives for Long-Term Solutions |
| | | | The Power of Incentives |
| | | | Our Recommendations |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| | | | Chapter 14. Regaining Investor Confidence |
| | | | Protecting Investors (Not) |
| | | | Investor Confidence |
| | | | Failing to Regain Confidence |
| | | | Regaining the Confidence |
| | | | Summary |
| | | | Endnotes |
| |
| |