The Marine Corps Way: Using Maneuver Warfare to Lead a Winning Organization

In the skies above Korea, North Korean and Chinese fighter pilots in Soviet-made MiG-15 planes were no match for their American counterparts, who flew F-86 Sabre jets , from 1951 to 1953. Colonel John Boyd dedicated the subsequent thirty-five years to analyzing reasons for the Americans success, and his groundbreaking theories brought considerable emphasis to relative decision-making speed as a key determinant of success in combat.

Despite the Soviet-made aircraft s superior capabilities in turning, climbing, and acceleration, American pilots shot down ten MiG-15s for every F-86 lost. The Americans achieved this impressive kill ratio by adjusting their aerial tactics to exploit the two key advantages that the F-86 enjoyed relative to the MiG-15: visibility and responsiveness. First, the F-86 s bubble canopy afforded its pilot an unobstructed view in nearly every direction, whereas the MiG-15 s canopy sacrificed the pilot s field of vision for superior aerodynamics and performance. Second, the F-86 s fully powered hydraulic flight controls, which were highly sensitive to the pilot s inputs, required far less physical and mental exertion during aerial maneuvers than did the MiG-15 s hydraulically boosted mechanical flight controls, thereby allowing faster execution and sequencing of actions as the combat unfolded.

Together a better field of vision and a more responsive set of flight controls enabled the F-86 pilot to transition more quickly and more effortlessly between individual maneuvers, and American pilots engaged the MiG-15s with a series of sudden, quick moves to which the MiG-15s could not respond. For example, if a MiG-15 were pursuing an F-86 and the F-86 started a turn in one direction and then quickly reversed its move, the MiG-15 would not be able to follow without falling slightly behind in the chase. As this series of moves and counter-moves repeated, the MiG-15 would fall farther and farther behind in time until the F-86 assumed the firing position (behind or perpendicular to the MiG-15) and shot the MiG-15 down.

Boyd disaggregated these aerial duels into discernible steps, which he believed could be generalized to all competitive encounters. He articulated these steps as the OODA loop , a continuous, time-competitive cycle in which each opponent : O bserved the other s behavior, O riented himself or herself to unfolding events, D ecided on a best possible course of action, and A cted . The articulation of the OODA loop became the forerunner of many studies that Boyd would conduct, and these studies, particularly his 1986 Patterns of Conflict , have left an indelible impression on modern maneuver warfare theory. Not only did Boyd go on to teach warfare theory at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, but there were also more Marine Corps officers present at his funeral than there were Air Force officers.

Leadership Lessons

The opponent that proceeds through the four-step OODA loop in less time operates inside the other s decision-making cycle and seizes the upper hand. And, given that OODA loops flow together in time, such rapid decision making in one OODA loop leads to success in others. If an opponent is already struggling to cope with the situation at hand when the other opponent s action begins an entirely new situation, effective response becomes increasingly difficult. Eventually, the effects of rapid decision making accumulate, and the slower-moving opponent is overcome .